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Infectious diseases are a major threat to humanity, and ac-
curate surveillance is essential. We describe how to imple-
ment a laboratory data–based surveillance system in a clini-
cal microbiology laboratory. Two historical Microsoft Excel 
databases were implemented. The data were then sorted 
and used to execute the following 2 surveillance systems 
in Excel: the Bacterial real-time Laboratory-based Surveil-
lance System (BALYSES) for monitoring the number of pa-
tients infected with bacterial species isolated at least once 
in our laboratory during the study periodl and the Marseille 
Antibiotic Resistance Surveillance System (MARSS), which 
surveys the primary β-lactam resistance phenotypes for 15 
selected bacterial species. The first historical database con-
tained 174,853 identifications of bacteria, and the second 
contained 12,062 results of antibiotic susceptibility testing. 
From May 21, 2013, through June 4, 2014, BALYSES and 
MARSS enabled the detection of 52 abnormal events for 24 
bacterial species, leading to 19 official reports. This system 
is currently being refined and improved.
Although infectious diseases were declared under con-trol and considered to be a past public health prob-
lem during the second half of the 20th century (1), these 
diseases, including those that are well-known, emerging, 
and reemerging, remain a major threat to humanity. Indeed, 
infectious pathogens possess an amazing common capac-
ity to emerge and spread in unpredictable ways before they 
are detected by public health institutions (2). Infectious dis-
eases have a substantial effect on both global human de-
mographics (they are the second leading cause of death in 
humans worldwide, accounting for ≈15 million deaths) (3) 
and the economy (4), which has led the public health com-
munity to reconsider them as a real threat. This alarming 
observation has led public health authorities to try to im-
prove infectious disease surveillance. 
One of these strategies, known as traditional public 
health surveillance of infectious diseases, has been to use 
clinical case reports from sentinel laboratories or laborato-
ry networks and direct reports of positive results from clini-
cal laboratories to survey the presence of microbial agents 
known to be dangers to health in a precise population (5). 
Some examples of surveillance systems implemented by 
using this strategy are the National Tuberculosis Surveil-
lance System in the United States (6), the surveillance sys-
tem of the Netherlands Reference Laboratory for Bacterial 
Meningitis (7) and the European Gonococcal Antimicro-
bial Surveillance Programme (8). 
Another strategy, known as syndromic surveillance, 
consists of developing real-time surveillance systems capa-
ble of detecting abnormal epidemiologic events, not on the 
basis of infectious disease diagnosis data, but rather on the 
basis of nonspecific health indicators, such as absenteeism, 
chief complaints, and prescription drug sales (5,9). Such 
surveillance systems can be implemented nationally, such 
as the Emergency Department Syndromic Surveillance 
System in England (10) or the National Retail Data Moni-
tor in the United States (11), and regionally, such as the 
Emergency Department Syndromic Surveillance in Canada 
(12) or the European Antimicrobial Resistance Surveil-
lance Network in Europe (13), or the systems can be ad-
ministered by laboratories with large quantities of data and 
the financial and human resources to apply the information.
On the basis of our experience at the Assistance Pub-
lique–Hôpitaux de Marseille (AP-HM), we describe all the 
steps necessary for implementing a laboratory data–based 
syndromic surveillance system in a laboratory. Because of 
its simplicity, we believe that it can be rapidly applied and 
used as a first surveillance tool in well-established labo-
ratories. We also show the advantages and limits of this 
surveillance system.
Materials and Methods
Study Setting
Marseille is the second-most populous French city (es-
timated population 850,726 persons in 2010). All data 
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analyzed in this article came from the 4 university hospi-
tals of Marseille (North, South, Conception, and Timone 
hospitals). Cumulatively, these hospitals represent ≈3,700 
beds, including ≈1,500 beds for the Timone Hospital, 
≈600 beds for the North Hospital, ≈700 beds for the Con-
ception Hospital, and ≈900 beds for the South Hospital. 
The AP-HM clinical microbiology laboratory is located at 
Timone Hospital; the laboratory performed ≈145,000 se-
rologic tests and ≈200,000 PCRs and cultures of microor-
ganisms from 220,000 samples in 2012 (14). This amount 
of data allowed us to implement our own laboratory-data–
based syndromic surveillance system.
Organization of Surveillance Activity on Tools of AP-HM
The AP-HM laboratory–based surveillance consists of 3 
following syndromic surveillance tools founded on Ex-
cel software (Mircosoft Corp., Redmond, WA, USA): 1 
previously described system called EPIMIC (EPIdemio-
logical biosurveillance and alert based on MICrobiologic 
data) (15,16), 1 surveillance system implemented for the 
surveillance of bacterial antibiotic resistance (MARSS, 
Marseille Antibiotic Resistance Surveillance System), 
and BALYSES (BActerial real-time LaboratorY-based 
SurveillancE System), which was developed for the sur-
veillance of the number of patients infected by each bac-
teria species identified at least once in our laboratory. Our 
surveillance systems are defined as syndromic surveil-
lance systems because no surveillance data are specifical-
ly collected for their use. The flow of information needed 
for each of the 3 surveillance systems is summarized in 
Figure 1. However, only BALYSES and MARSS are fur-
ther described. 
All of the data routinely used for the 2 surveillance 
systems are manually collected from the Timone Hos-
pital laboratory information management systems and 
processed by using Microsoft Excel software (2007 ver-
sion). Data are then entered in the 2 surveillance systems 
according to their nature. The 2 systems automatically 
compare the entered data with their specific thresholds. 
Alarms are emitted by the systems if the entered values 
exceed thresholds. The emitted alarms are analyzed week-
ly during a specific thematic epidemiology meeting with 
laboratory staff. If alarms are validated, further investi-
gations are immediately conducted by biologists, clini-
cians, and medical residents. After the alarm is signaled, 
our institution’s team in charge of nosocomial infections, 
called the Centre de Coordination de la Lutte contre les 
Infections Nosocomiales, initiates an investigation. Fi-
nally, if these investigations reveal that the alarm events 
were real epidemiologic events (thereafter called true 
alarms), official reports can be sent to an official region-
al public health institution, the Agence Régionale de la 
Santé (ARS).
Laboratory Data–Based Syndromic  
Surveillance System
BALYSES
The BALYSES surveillance system was implemented 
and has been routinely used since January 2013. The first 
version of BALYSES was implemented to automatically 
compare the weekly number of samples positive for each 
bacterial species identified at least once at our institution 
with the mean historical weekly values ± 2 SDs (Table 1, 
http://wwwnc.cdc.gov/EID/article/21/8/14-1419-T1.htm). 
In October 2013, BALYSES was improved to survey the 
weekly number of patients infected by each bacterial spe-
cies (Figure 2; Table 1). Then, if alarms are emitted that 
indicate an abnormal increase in the number of isolations of 
a specific bacterial species, an additional Microsoft Excel 
interface is used to show more details, including the hospi-
tals and units in which the patients received care, the types 
of samples from which the bacterial species were isolated, 
and the patients’ identification numbers. BALYSES also 
automatically classifies the bacterial species from most to 
least abundant, according to the weekly number of infected 
patients, and calculates their weekly rank. It finally calcu-
lates the maximum number of patients infected by each of 
the bacterial species monitored, indicates the date of first 
isolation of the bacterial species at AP-HM, and identifies 
the historical rank (on the basis of the historical number of 
patients infected) among the other bacterial species.
MARSS
The MARSS surveillance program has been used since 
April 2013. Fifteen bacterial species are monitored by 
MARSS, including Escherichia coli, Klebsiella pneumoni-
ae, K. oxytoca, Proteus mirabilis, Enterobacter cloacae, 
Enterobacter aerogenes, Morganella morganii, Serratia 
marcescens, Pseudomonas aeruginosa, Acinetobacter 
baumannii, Streptococcus agalactiae, Enterococcus faeca-
lis, Enterococcus faecium, Staphylococcus aureus, and S. 
epidermidis. MARSS automatically compares the weekly 
number of isolates exhibiting a given β-lactam resistance 
phenotype to the mean value ± 2 SDs for the historical 
number of strains harboring this phenotype (Figure 3). 
Alarms are emitted when this threshold is exceeded. In par-
allel, MARSS emits alarms for key phenotypes to allow for 
their rapid identification and verification (Tables 2, 3).
Historical Databases
The detection of abnormal events necessitates the calcula-
tion of expected references, previously called historical 
thresholds. To define the expected references, 2 historical 
databases were built by using data extracted from the labo-
ratory information management systems of the 4 university 
hospitals of Marseille. The first historical database consisted 
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of all of the bacterial identifications obtained from January 
2002 to December 2013 (excluding December 2002, data 
unavailable), including those described in a previous work 
(17), and a second database consisted of most antimicrobi-
al resistance profiles obtained from October 2012 through 
March 2013. These data were then processed with Microsoft 
Excel software (2007 version) and sorted. The first database 
was then sorted, and only samples from which bacterial spe-
cies were properly identified were conserved. Then, the du-
plicates for patient and bacterial species were removed. The 
second database was sorted into different Microsoft Excel 
spreadsheets for the most frequently isolated bacterial spe-
cies. Duplicates occurring within the same week were then 
removed on the basis of the same methods.
Results
Databases and Surveillance Systems
The first version of the 11-year historical BALYSES da-
tabase contained 161,374 bacterial identifications corre-
sponding to 568 different bacterial species. The 10 most 
numerous bacterial species were E. coli (37,560 patients), 
S. aureus (23,562 patients), S. epidermidis (11,091 pa-
tients), P. aeruginosa (9,113 patients), K. pneumoniae 
(7,576 patients), E. faecalis (7,403 patients), S. agalactiae 
(4,473 patients), E. cloacae (4,453 patients), P. mirabilis 
(4,415 patients), and Haemophilus influenzae (2,424 pa-
tients). The 2013 updates increased the number of bacte-
rial identifications to 174,853 and the number of monitored 
bacterial species to 611 (43 new bacterial species were 
added). Among them, 384 bacterial species, defined here 
as rare bacterial species, were identified <11 times in the 
12-year period.
The historical MARSS database included 12,062 an-
tibiograms from October 2012 to March 2013. Here, the 
10 most frequently isolated bacterial species were E. coli 
(3,293 strains), S. aureus (1,613 strains), Achromobacter 
xylosoxidans (1,478 strains), S. epidermidis (822 strains), 
E. faecalis (749 strains), K. pneumoniae (729 strains), 
P. mirabilis (455 strains), S. agalactiae (322 strains), 
E. cloacae (278 strains), and Staphylococcus hominis 
(153 strains).
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Figure 1. Workflow of real-time surveillance systems used by Institut Hospitalo–Universitaire Méditérranée Infection, Assistance 
Publique-Hôpitaux de Marseille, Marseille, France.
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Alarms Validated and Investigated,  
May 21, 2013– June 4, 2014 
From May 21, 2013, through June 4, 2014 (55 weeks), 
BALYSES detected 21 alarms (6 confirmed events and 
15 unconfirmed events), corresponding to ≈0.4 alarms per 
week. These alarms led to 5 official reports to the ARS of 
the Provence-Alpes-Côte d’Azur (PACA) region, France 
(Table 1; Figure 4). The positive predictive value for the 
study period was 0.28. Sixteen bacterial species triggered 
alarms in this surveillance system. The bacterial spe-
cies that triggered alarms were E. aerogenes (3 alarms), 
Aeromonas hydrophila (2 alarms), E. cloacae (2 alarms), 
K. oxytoca (2 alarms), M. morganii (2 alarms), E. coli (1 
alarm), E. faecium (1 alarm), Gardnerella vaginalis (1 
alarm), Haemophilus parahaemolyticus (1 alarm), Morax-
ella catarrhalis (1 alarm), Raoultella ornithinolytica (1 
alarm), Staphylococcus capitis (1 alarm), Staphylococcus 
gallolyticus (1 alarm), Staphylococcus hominis (1 alarm), 
and Staphylococcus saprophyticus (1 alarm). As an exam-
ple of the system’s usefulness, BALYSES allowed us to 
detect a real nosocomial transmission of R. ornithinolytica 
between 2 patients in the intensive care unit at the Timone 
Hospital on June 4, 2013 (Table 1).
In parallel, MARSS detected 31 alarms (16 confirmed 
events and 15 unconfirmed events, ≈0.6 alarms/week), 
which led to 15 official reports to the ARS of the PACA 
region, France (Table 4, http://wwwnc.cdc.gov/EID/
article/21/8/14-1419-T4htm; Figure 4). The positive pre-
dictive value for the study period was 0.52. Thirteen bac-
terial species triggered alarms in MARSS. Here, the bac-
terial species, in order according to the number of alarms 
triggered, were K. pneumoniae (13 alarms), E. cloacae (3 
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Figure 2. Screen shots from the Bacterial Real-Time Laboratory-based Surveillance System. A) List of the 652 bacterial species 
followed by the Bacterial Real-time Surveillance System and all of the contained information. B) Interface summarizing information from 
the alarms. ID_bac_v2.0, all the bacterial species followed by the surveillance system; Nb_patts_histori, the historical number of patients 
infected by the bacterium; Rank_historic, the historical rank of a precise bacterium under surveillance; Date_1st_ID, the date of first 
identification of the bacterium.
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alarms), P. mirabilis (3 alarms), E. coli (2 alarms), E. aero-
genes (2 alarms), Salmonella spp. (2 alarms), P. aerugi-
nosa (1 alarms), Citrobacter koseri (1 alarm), M. morga-
nii (1 alarm), S. marcescens (1 alarm), S. epidermidis (1 
alarm), and S. agalactiae (1 alarm). As an example of the 
system’s usefulness, MARSS allowed us to detect a local 
outbreak of oxicillinase-48 carbapenemase–producing K. 
pneumoniae from July 2013 to October 2013 (11 patients 
infected) (unpub. data; Table 4, http://wwwnc.cdc.gov/
EID/article/21/8/14-1419-T4.htm).
For clarification, not all of the true alarms led to of-
ficial reports because we did not identify the reasons why 
these abnormal increases occurred (Tables 1, 4). Nev-
ertheless, investigations are ongoing to try to elucidate 
these phenomena.
Discussion
Analysis of 2 Real-Time Laboratory-Based  
Surveillance Systems
Implementing surveillance systems on the basis of data that 
were not specifically collected for surveillance is one of the 
advantage of our systems. Indeed, these types of systems, 
syndromic surveillance systems, are well suited in places 
and situations in which surveillance tools are urgently 
needed (18). In our situation, this approach allowed us to 
rapidly implement the system and quickly detect abnormal 
events related to bacterial infections occurring in our insti-
tution (19 official reports) (Tables 1, 4; Figure 4).
The fact that all of the emitted alarms are systemati-
cally validated during epidemiologic meetings with micro-
biologists (Figure 1) is also a strength of this laboratory 
surveillance system. Thus, the system enables rapid veri-
fication and filtering of false alarms to ensure that the of-
ficial reports sent to the regional health authorities (ARS) 
are correct. This facilitates a rapid public health response 
to counter possible epidemics. As an example, EPIMIC, 
our third surveillance system not described here (Figure 1) 
(15,16), allowed us to detect a nosocomial outbreak of the 
hypervirulent Clostridium difficile ribotype O27 that start-
ed in March 2013 (19). As we continue to fight this major 
public health problem, a list of recommended containment 
measures, such as systematic isolation of infected patients 
in special care units or systematic screening of patients at 
risk, is being published and transmitted to our institutional 
and regional health care providers.
Our 2 surveillance systems have been implemented by 
using Microsoft Excel software. This strategy makes the 
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Figure 3. Marseille Antibiotic Resistance Surveillance System (MARSS) interface for Escherichia coli. A) Screen shot showing list of 
most of the β-lactam antibiotic resistance profiles coded for E. coli in MARSS. B) Example of graph created by using MARSS showing 
the evolution of the antibiotic resistance of E. coli. 
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systems easy to handle and allows rapid modifications and 
improvements without the need for in-depth computer skills. 
These advantages may not be the case for fully designed 
website surveillance systems such as the Swiss Antibiotic 
Resistance Surveillance database (20) or the Real-Time Out-
break and Disease Surveillance (RODS) (21). These aspects 
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Table 2. Summary of the normal phenotypes registered in MARSS* 
Bacterial species Resistance phenotypes 
β-lactam antibiotics 
AMX TIC AMC TCC TZP FOX OXA CRO FEP CAZ IPM 
Escherichia coli Wild-type S S S S    S S  S 
 Low-level penicillinase I/R I/R S S    S S  S 
 Inhibitor-resistant penicillinase I/R I/R R R    S S  S 
 High-level penicillinase I/R I/R I/R I/R    S S  S 
 ESBL R R S/I/R S/I/R    I/R I/R  S 
 High-level cephalosporinase R R R R    R S  S 
Klebsiella 
pneumoniae 
Wild-type   S  S   S S  S 
ESBL   I/R  I/R   I/R I/R  S 
 High-level cephalosporinase   I/R  I/R   I/R S  S 
 ESBL-TZP-sensible   I/R  S   I/R I/R  S 
Proteus mirabilis Wild S S S S    S S  S 
Low-level penicillinase I/R I/R S S    S S  S 
Inhibitor-resistant penicillinase R R R R    S S  S 
High-level penicillinase R R I/R I/R    S S  S 
ESBL R R I/R I/R    I/R I/R  S 
High-level cephalosporinase R R R R    R S  S 
Klebsiella oxytoca Wild-type   S  S    S  S 
ESBL   I/R  I/R    I/R  S 
High-level penicillinase   I/R  S/I/R    S  S 
Low-level penicillinase   S  R    S  S 
ESBL–TZP-sensible   I/R  S    I/R  S 
Enterobacter 
aerogenes 
Wild-type    S S   S S  S 
Inhibitors-resistant penicillinase    R R   S S  S 
ESBL    S/I/R I/R   I/R I/R  S 
High-level cephalosporinase    I/R I/R   I/R S  S 
Morganella 
morganii 
Wild-type    S S   S S  S 
Inhibitor-resistant penicillinase    R R   S S  S 
ESBL    S/I/R I/R   I/R I/R  S 
High-level cephalosporinase    I/R I/R   I/R S  S 
Serratia 
marcescens 
Wild-type    S S   S S  S 
Inhibitor-resistant penicillinase    R R   S S  S 
ESBL    S/I/R I/R   I/R I/R  S 
High-level cephalosporinase    I/R I/R   I/R S  S 
Enterobacter 
cloacae 
Wild-type    S S   S S  S 
Inhibitor-resistant penicillinase    R R   S S  S 
ESBL    S/I/R I/R   I/R I/R  S 
High-level cephalosporinase    I/R I/R   I/R S  S 
Pseudomonas 
aeruginosa 
Wild-type  S  S S    S S S 
Penicillinase  R  R/I/S I/S    S S S 
High-level penicillinase  I/R  I/R I/R    S S S 
ESBL  I/R  I/R I/R    I/R I/R S 
Selective permeability to 
imipenem 
 S  S S    S S R 
Penicillinase, loss of D2 porine  R  R S    S S R 
Acinetobacter 
baumannii 
Wild-type  S  S      S S 
Penicillinase  R  R/I/S      S S 
ESBL  I/R  I/R      I/R S 
Streptococcus 
agalactiae 
Wild       S S    
Oxacillin-resistant       I/R S    
Enterococcus 
faecalis 
Wild-type S           
E. faecium Wild-type I/R           
Staphylococcus 
aureus 
Wild-type      S      
Methicillin-resistant      I/R      
S. epidermidis Wild-type      S      
Methicillin-resistant      I/R      
*MARSS, Marseille Antibiotic Resistance Surveillance System; AMC, amoxicillin; TIC, ticarcillin; AMC, amoxicillin/clavulanic acid; TIC, ticarcillin/clavulanic 
acid; TZP, piperacillin/tazobactam; FOX, cefoxitin; OXA, oxacillin; CRO, ceftriaxone; FEP, cefepime; CAZ, ceftazidime; IMP, imipenem; S, susceptible;  
I, intermediate; R, resistant; ESBL, extended-spectrum β-lactamase. 
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are key factors for the optimal long-term use at the hospital 
level because surveillance systems can be considered com-
plex socio-technical systems with the objective of assisting 
users during abnormal epidemic events (22).
The implementation of our 2 surveillance systems re-
quired 1 full-time PhD student for 4 months and a computer 
with standard configuration equipped with Microsoft Of-
fice version 2003 or 2007. In France, the national research 
agency requires that the minimum salary of a PhD student 
is 33,000€ per year. Considering that the average price for 
a basic computer equipped with Microsoft Office is ≈500€ 
and that the PhD student’s salary for the 4 months was 
11,000€, plus the administrative and management costs, 
the total consolidated cost of these surveillance systems 
was ≈13,800€ (US $17,000).
The use of our own microbiology laboratory data 
ensures the availability and the completeness of the data. 
These problems are frequently mentioned when surveil-
lance systems collect data from various health care institu-
tions. For example, the designers of the German Surveil-
lance System of Antibiotic Use and Bacterial Resistance 
encountered problems comparing antibiogram data be-
tween participating intensive care units. Indeed, in Ger-
many, laboratories did not apply 1 standard to determine 
antibiotic-resistance profiles of the bacterial species (23). 
Moreover, the increasing number of intensive care units 
joining the surveillance system may effect the comparabil-
ity of collected data because recently added intensive care 
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Table 3. Summary of the alarm phenotypes defined in MARSS* 
 
Bacteria species 
Alarm triggering key 
phenotypes 
Escherichia coli, Proteus 
mirabilis 
Carbapenem resistance 
Klebsiella pneumoniae Carbapenem resistance 
Klebsiella oxytoca Carbapenem resistance 
Enterobacter aerogenes, 
Morganella morganii, Serratia 
marcescens, Enterobacter 
cloacae 
Carbapenem resistance 
Pseudomonas aeruginosa Carbapenem resistance 
Acinetobacter spp. Carbapenem and colistin 
resistance 
Streptococcus agalactiae Ceftriaxone resistance 
Enterococcus faecalis Amoxicillin resistance 
Enterococcus faecium Amoxicillin susceptible 
Staphylococcus aureus Vancomycin resistance 
*MARSS, Marseille Antibiotic Resistance Surveillance System. 
 
Figure 4. Time chart of the confirmed and unconfirmed events identified by the Marseille Antibiotic Resistance Surveillance System 
(MARSS) and the Bacterial real-time Laboratory-based Surveillance System (BALYSES). A) List of all the abnormal events (confirmed 
or not) detected by MARSS. B) List of all the abnormal events (confirmed or not) detected by BALYSES. Open arrows, unconfirmed 
events; solid arrows, confirmed events; asterisk (*), alarm due to abnormal increases or abnormal isolations; dagger (†), alarm due to 
strain with abnormal antibiotic susceptibility results.
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units may use different antibiotic drugs, thus leading to 
different antimicrobial resistance profiles (24). Poor qual-
ity data were also observed in the emergency department 
syndromic surveillance system in New York, primarily be-
cause of the lack of human resources (25).
However, our surveillance systems have 2 main limi-
tations. The first limitation is the statistical analysis used 
for the detection of abnormal events. As described before, 
our surveillance systems compared entered data with the 
historical means ± 2 SDs. For our purposes, this tool was 
simple to develop and was used effectively to detect ab-
normal events. However, these statistics do not consider 
seasonal variations in pathogen isolation, especially for 
rare bacterial species. To address this problem, Enki et al. 
improved the detection algorithms according to the fre-
quency of isolation of the 3,303 pathogens included in the 
20-year LabBase surveillance database recovered from the 
UK Health Protection Agency (26). They discovered that 
although all of these organisms varied greatly in their isola-
tion frequency, most of them could be surveyed by using 
quasi-Poisson or negative binomial models for which the 
variance is proportional to the mean. In MARSS, the use 
of moving averages in our kinetic graphs or of cumulative 
sum control charts, as has been done in RODS (http://open-
rods.sourceforge.net/), could also be effective improve-
ments for the detection of abnormal events.
The second limitation was that all of the data in our 
system were manually collected and entered into the sur-
veillance system. This aspect can introduce bias into our 
data analysis. For example, we have already observed false 
alarms after shifts in data collection because of national 
holidays or because of the lack of human resources, which 
is a problem also observed in other surveillance systems, 
such as the emergency department syndromic surveillance 
system in New York (25). To address these issues, simple 
solutions can be developed, such as implementing and us-
ing informatic tools for automatic collection and process-
ing of the collected data. This solution was implemented 
by the designers of ASTER, the French military decision-
supported surveillance system (22).
With knowledge of the previously mentioned weak-
nesses, we are currently working to improve our 2 sur-
veillance systems. Thus, a surveillance platform that will 
merge all of the surveillance activities and will contain 
stronger statistical tools for the surveillance of abnormal 
events is under development. This platform will help us 
survey abnormal events by using all of the clinical mi-
crobiology data available in the laboratory. Moreover, 
our monitoring activity is expanding to other laborato-
ries in the PACA region. We are implementing a regional 
laboratory surveillance system that will allow us, on the 
basis of the clinical microbiology data that are collected 
every week, to gain a better understanding of the local 
dissemination of pathogens at the regional level and to 
survey weekly isolation frequencies. Finally, another sur-
veillance system based on matrix-assisted laser desorp-
tion/ionization–time of flight spectra of bacteria is cur-
rently under development in our laboratory. A prototype 
is used weekly in our laboratory to try to detect epidem-
ics, including the possible nosocomial transmission of 
bacterial clones.
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